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Selling Out the Farm?
The Impact of the Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002
on Lending Institutions and the Small Farmer
I. INTRODUCTION
American farm and ranch families embody some of the
best values of our nation: hard work and risk-taking,
love of the land and love of our country .... This bill is
generous, and will provide a safety net for farmers ....
It will allow farmers and ranchers to plan and operate
based on market realities, not government dictates.'
-President George W. Bush, Remarks Upon Signing
the 2002 Farm Bill
Between 1995 and 2003, Ken Lay of the Enron Corporation
received $22,486 in federal farm subsidies to idle land he owns in
Texas.2 Basketball player Scottie Pippen, formerly of the Chicago
Bulls, received $210,520 in federal farm subsidies during the same time
period for idling land he owns in Arkansas. 3  While the average
payment to the bottom eighty percent of farm subsidy recipients
between 1995 and 2003 was $6,918, 4 John Hancock Mutual Life
Insurance and Georgia Pacific, both Fortune 500 companies, received a
total of $2,923,611.79. 5
1. George W. Bush, Remarks upon Signing the Farm Bill, (May 13, 2002) (Federal
News Service).
2. The Environmental Working Group, Top Recipients of Subsidies in the United
States, at http://www.ewg.org:16080/farm/persondetail.php?custnumber=011434621 (last
visited Feb. 6, 2005).
3. Id. at http://www.ewg.org:16080/farm/persondetail.php?custnumber=005157951
(last visited Feb. 6, 2005).
4. The Environmental Working Group, Total USDA-Subsidies in the United States, at
http://www.ewg.org/farm/progdetail.php?fips=00000&progcode=total&page=conc (last
visited Feb. 6, 2005).
5. The Environmental Working Group, Top Programs in the United States, 1995-
2003, at http://www.ewg.org/farm/addrsearch.php?s=yup&stab=US&city=&c=See+Recip
ients&zip=&last=&first=&fullname=john+hancock+mutual (last visited Feb. 6, 2005);
http://www.ewg.org/farm/addrsearch.php?s=yup&stab=US&city=&c=See+Recipients&zip
=&last=&first=&fullname=georgia+pacific (last visited Feb. 6, 2005).
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Federal farm subsidy programs have remained controversial
since their inception in 1933.6 While many Americans view subsidies
as a good way to help the nostalgic "small family farm" survive, others
disagree with the overall philosophy behind subsidies. These critics
feel that subsidies amount to little more than a food tax on consumers,'
or that they thwart truly free trade in an age of increased globalization. 9
Despite this constant controversy, however, subsidies have been a
mainstay of American agricultural policy for over half a century and
show no signs of becoming obsolete."'
America's acceptance of federal subsidy policy was formally
reaffirmed on May 13, 2002, when President George W. Bush signed
into law the Farm Security and Rural Investment Act (FSRIA).11
Although many continue to debate the general efficacy of farm
subsidies, this Note examines the specific issue of how FSRIA subsidies
negatively impact the financial relationship between small farmers and
lending institutions.1 2  The issue merits attention as according to the
6. Edward Lotterman, Farm Bills and Farmers: The Effect of Subsidies Over Time,
FED. RES. BANK MINNEAPOLIS, Dec. 1996, at http://woodrow.mpls.frb.fed.us/pubs/
region/96-12/farmbill.cfm (last visited Feb. 6, 2005).
7. See Brian M. Riedl, Still at the Federal Trough: Farm Subsidies for the Rich and
Famous Shattered Records in 2001, HERITAGE FOUND. BACKGROUNDER, Apr. 30, 2002, at 1.
8. See Brian M. Riedl, The Cost of America's Farm Subsidy Binge: An Average of $1
Million per Farm, HERITAGE FOUND. BACKGROUNDER, Dec. 10, 2001, at 1. The Heritage
Foundation estimates that subsidies result in $190 billion in food taxes on American
families and an additional burden of $271 billion in inflated food prices. Id.
9. See Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Reaction to U.S. Farm
Act Highlights Tension between Domestic Politics and International Obligation (July 1,
2002), at http://www.globalizationlOl.org/ news.asp?NEWSID=29. "America's trading
partners have condemned [American subsidy policies] as a politically driven, protectionist
measure that violated World Trade Organization (WTO) rules on agricultural subsidies
established in the Uruguay Round of trade talks." Id. According to the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation (FDIC), the WTO talks scheduled to occur in December of 2005 will
focus on a new trade framework, including "outlines for formulas for reducing import
barriers, export subsidies, and domestic support programs." John Anderlik et al., The U.S.
Agricultural Sector: Recent Events Highlight Ongoing Systemic Risks, FDIC OUTLOOK, Fall
2004.
10. See, e.g., Bush, supra note 1.
II. 7 U.S.C. § 7901 (2004).
12. USDA ECON. RES. SERV., Briefing Room: Farm Structure Glossary, at
http://www.ers.usda.gov/Briefing/ FarmStructure/glossary.htm#smlfarm (last visited Feb. 6,
2005). This Note adopts the USDA definition of the small farmer. Id. Identifying the line
between "small" and "large" farms, however, is not without difficulties. For an excellent
discussion of the problems inherent in defining the small farm, see generally Farm
Foundation, Small and Underserved Farmers at http://www.farmfoundation.org/2002FB/8-
5.pdf (last visited Feb. 6, 2005). This Note also primarily considers the relationship
between small farmers and commercial banks. It is important to note, however, that there
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2002 Census of Agriculture, small farmers make up ninety two percent
of the all farmers in the United States.' 3 Careful examination of FSRIA
indicates that as subsidy payments to large farms increase, a cycle
emerges that increases the risk of lending to small farmers, who are
defined as those farmers making an annual income of less than
$250,000.14 As this risk of lending to small farmers increases, lending
institutions should engage in careful risk management when deciding to
extend credit to small farmers.' 5
Part II of this Note describes the advent of agricultural subsidies
in America, outlines Congress' attempt at reform in 1996, and discusses
the passage of FSRIA and how FSRIA constituted a poorly devised
return to pre-1996 agricultural policy.' 6  Part III focuses on the
mechanics of the FSRIA subsidies, how FSRIA .subsidies increase the
risk of lending to small farmers, and what lenders can do to minimize
this risk. 17 Finally, Part IV discusses the impact of FSRIA, as well as
FSRIA's specific impact on both lending institutions and the health of
the small farm.' 8
II. AN OVERVIEW OF AMERICAN AGRICULTURAL POLICY: 1933 TO 2002
A. The Rise of Subsidies in the United States
The speculation-induced prosperity of the 1920s crumbled on
Black Thursday,' 9 sending the entire economy into a tailspin.
20  By
are additional avenues of credit, although strictly limited, available to farmers through the
Farm Credit System (FCS). See Susan A. Schneider, Financing the Agricultural Operation:
Recent Developments and Current Trends, 4 DRAKE J. AGRIC., 216, 225-30 (1999). While
the FCS is a "network of federally-chartered, borrower-owned cooperatives that was
specifically created to provide a competitive source of agricultural credit," the institution
has been significantly limited in its authority and lending abilities over time. Id.
13. USDA NATL. AGRIC. STATISTICS SERV., Economic Class of Farms by Market Value
of Agricultural Products Sold and Government Payments, at http://www.nass.
usda.gov/census/census02/volumel/us/st 9 9 -1003_003.pdf (last visited Feb. 6, 2005). The
raw data suggest that 1,969,188, or ninety two percent of American farms make less than
$250,000 per year. Large farms, on the other hand, or those farms making more than
$250,000, constitute only eight percent of American farms, or 159,794. Id.
14. See infra notes 94-126 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 94-206 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 19-88 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 89-206 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 207-218 and accompanying text.
19. See GARY B. NASH & JULIE R. JEFFREY, THE AMERICAN PEOPLE, CREATING A
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1933, further deterioration of the economy had spawned a wave of bank
failures alongside widespread unemployment and hunger in rural
areas. Adverse weather in the midwest further exacerbated the crisis.
22
During this time period, annual farmer income fell to approximately
fifty percent of the national average income.23
The Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933 (the AAA) purported
to provide a pragmatic response to the crisis. 24  Creating the
mechanisms that would be drawn upon by later federal farm legislation,
the AAA "authorized direct payments to producers who curtailed output
of crops and livestock, '25 and made these payments available to
subsidize specific commodities including grains, cotton, and tobacco. 26
In 1938, Congress amended the AAA to include, among other things, a
provision making commodity loans available to qualifying farmers as a
method for stabilizing farm income and decreasing supply. 27 Although
the AAA was amended repeatedly over the years to subsidize a growing
number of specified commodities, its basic structure would remain in
force for nearly sixty years.28
B. The Freedom to Farm in 1996
Once the AAA was enacted, Congress merely passed a farm bill
every few years to extend its basic structure, usually with minor
modifications. 29  As a result, most farm policy analysts expected
existing legislation to be extended again in 1995.30 One journalist
quipped that "every four years, just like the Winter Olympics, Congress
NATION AND A SOCIETY 810 (Bruce Borland ed., Harper Collins 1994). On Oct. 24, 1929,
"it first seemed that everyone was trying to sell, but at the end of the day the panic appeared
over. It was not. By mid-November, the market had plummeted to 224, about half of what
it had been two months before. This represented a loss on paper of over $26 billion." Id.






26. See Lotterman, supra note 6.
27. Id.
28. Id. Although beyond the scope of this Note, Lotterman traces American
agricultural policy in detail from 1933 to 1996. Id.
29. Id.
30. See Lotterman, supra note 6.
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reauthorizes farm programs.' In 1994, however, public concern over
federal budget deficits, compounded with a deregulatory mood in
Congress, suggested that legislative modification of farm subsidy
programs was possible.32 High commodity prices and a positive outlook
for the export market in 1995 also contributed to the atmosphere
favoring reform, as the favorable economic conditions would allow
farmers to perform even in the absence of federal subsidies.33
Reform came to fruition in the Federal Agricultural
Improvement and Reform Act of 1996 (FAIR). 34 The fundamental goal
of FAIR was to give farmers "more control over their planting decisions
in return for fewer subsidies. 35 Instead of providing subsidy payments
only when specific crops were grown, as the AAA did with grains,
cotton, and tobacco, FAIR created a system of "production flexibility
contracts" (PFCs). 36 PFCs were fixed payments that would be made
regardless of what crops a farmer chose to plant.37 This system of PFCs
gave FAIR its informal name, the Freedom to Farm Act, and provided
the farmer with more discretion over his planting choices and the factors
he could take into consideration when making planting decisions.
38
PFCs were not permitted to fluctuate with market prices until the end of
each fiscal year and would decrease annually until they were phased out
over a period of seven years.39 Since traditionally subsidized crops
were capital intensive and usually had to be grown on large amounts of
land to be profitable, the 1996 legislation gave small farmers the unique
ability to sample new markets and react to changing market conditions
while providing a safe harbor in which they could adjust if innovative
ideas failed.4 °
FAIR thus ended a sixty-year old tradition of subsidizing the
31. Charles Schumer, Pork the Farmers' Favorite Meat, WALL ST. J., May 17, 1995, at
A20.
32. See Lotterman, supra note 6.
33. Chris Edwards & Tad DeHaven, Farm Subsidies at Record Levels as Congress
Considers New Fann Bill, CATO INST., Oct. 18, 2001, at 4.
34. See Riedl, supra note 8, at 1; John E. Frydenlund, The Erosion of Freedom to Farn,
HERITAGE FOUND. BACKGROUNDER, Mar. 8, 2002, at 2.
35. See Riedl, supra note 8, at 2.
36. Id.
37. See Edwards & DeHaven, supra note 33, at 4.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 5; see also Frydenlund, supra note 34, at 3.
20051
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production of corn, wheat, rice, and cotton. 4' Although FAIR failed to
dismantle peanut, sugar, and dairy subsidy programs, analysts described
FAIR as "an historic break from farm policies of the Depression Era. 42
This was so because FAIR envisioned a transition toward market-
oriented agriculture by phasing out crop subsidies over time, replacing
federal legislation with the free market as determinative of commodity
prices.43 FAIR was statutorily set to expire in September of 2002, at
which time the law would revert to the 1949 subsidies legislation unless
Congress intervened.44
C. Passage of the Farm Security and Rural Investment Act in 2002
By 1997, some of the effects of FAIR were becoming clear.
Deregulation was "one of the biggest experiments ever conducted on
the U.S. food system," and unprecedented crop switching and a new
managerial focus were changing the business of farming.49 Instead of
merely acting as production machines, farmers had to exercise business
acumen, something subsidy programs had never required, and indeed,
possibly discouraged.46 Despite the higher risks associated with making
market-based choices, farmers were able to diversify planting and
assume a greater role in the decision-making process.4 7
Midway through 1998, however, prices of major commodities,
including wheat, corn, and soybeans began to fall, despite a drought that
threatened to eliminate the entire crops of farmers in the southern
United States. 48 Further compounding the general unease, demand for
41. Bruce Ingersoll, Farm Bill Ending Some Crop Limits, Biggest Subsidy Efforts
Moves Forward, WALL ST. J., Mar. 22, 1996, at A3.
42. Bruce Ingersoll, Congress Passes New Farm Bill that Dismantles Subsidy
Programs after Much Vote Trading, WALL ST. J., Apr. 1, 1996, at A 16.
43. Ingersoll, supra note 41.
44. Ingersoll, supra note 42.
45. Scott Kilman, Turning the Soil: Free Market Comes to the Farm, Throws Some
Folks for a Loop, WALL ST. J., June 16, 1997, at Al.
46. Id.
47. Id. Interestingly, during this time period, the business of agricultural consulting
emerged as a way to help newly deregulated farmers make crop decisions. Id.
48. Scott Kilman, Decline in Exports to Asia and a Drought Worry Farmers, WALL ST.
J., July 16, 1998, at A2. "In 1997, an international economic crisis that began in Thailand
spread to other Asian countries. This set off a downturn in the economic and financial
condition in Asia, the largest market for U.S. agricultural and food products." Frydenlund,
supra note 34, at 4.
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U.S. agricultural products throughout Asia began to decline as
economic troubles on that continent mounted.49 While economists
doubted that agriculture was heading towards a financial crisis similar
to that of the mid-1980s,5 ° public pressure resulted in a $60 billion
congressional aid package that contained $4.2 billion in emergency aid
that would boost farm commodity prices and aid farmers in the south.51
This bill was the first of many emergency farm bills that had the effect
of eliminating much of the monumental deregulation achieved under
FAIR.52 President Bush signed the last supplemental farm emergency
bill in July of 2001, 53 and by December of 2001, Congress was locked
into a debate over how to handle the expiration of FAIR in 2002.54
D. Substance and Scope of the Farm Security and Rural Investment Act
(FSRIA)
During this debate, proponents of the bill that would become
FSRIA "maintained that rural communities across America rely on
agriculture as their primary source of income," and that without farm
subsidies, the small family farm would disappear.55  Detractors
49. See Kilman, supra note 48.
50. See generally Lotterman, supra note 6. By the mid-1980s, land prices had
decreased by as much as fifty percent in some areas and agricultural banks began to fail as
the property they obtained as a result of foreclosure was worth significantly less than when
they accepted the property as security for farmers' debt. Id. Congress passed the Food
Security Act of 1985, which contained a $70 billion bailout plan for farmers that would
extend over a three-year period. See Marj Charlier, Farm Fallout: Rural Crisis May Hurt
Rest of Economy, Many Experts Believe, WALL ST. J., Dec. 24, 1985, at Al. Despite
passage of the Food Security Act, economists at the time predicted that ten percent of
farmers would be out of business by 1987, defaulting on $25 billion in farm debt. Id. From
1985 until 1995, there were no moves to reform agricultural policy, despite the devastation
that was left behind. See generally NEIL E. HARL, THE FARM DEBT CRISIS OF THE 1980S 224
(Richard Kirkendall ed., Iowa State Univ. Press 1990).
51. Selling the Farm, WALL ST. J., Oct. 12, 1998, at A18. Interestingly, the extra farm
aid may not have been the Clinton Administration's idea. At least one editorial referred to
the farm aid as "a [Republican] concession to Senate Democrats to preserve their support in
[Clinton's] impeachment proceedings." Id.
52. Edwards & DeHaven, supra note 33, at 2.
53. See David Rogers, Bush Will Sign Farm-Rescue Bill, But Issue Still Will Haunt
Budget, WALL. ST. J., Aug. 6, 2001, at A14.
54. See Riedl, supra note 8, at 1. It is timely to note that as early as Sept. of 2001, at
least one analyst predicted that the farm bill "would more than wipe out what remains of
non-Social Security surpluses projected for the next few years." David Rogers, House GOP
Plans Massive Farm-Spending Bill, WALL. ST. J., Sept. 7, 2001, at A2.
55. See Beau Hurtig, Note, The 2002 Farm Bill: One Small Step for Family Farmers,
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maintained that the legislation was regressive and too expensive, as it
was projected at the time to add over $183 billion in agricultural
spending over a ten-year period.56 Despite these concerns, Congress
passed FSRIA, which will expire in 2012 unless Congress takes action
to extend it.
57
According to the Congressional Budget Office, FSRIA will
increase direct government spending on agricultural programs by $87.3
billion through 2012.8 When combined with spending authorized prior
to its enactment, FSRIA will bring total spending on agricultural
programs to $869.3 billion over this time period, with a record $242.5
billion or twenty eight percent of that sum going to the commodity
subsidy programs alone.59
Although FSRIA purports to address a range of issues, including
conservation, energy, trade, agricultural research, and nutrition, this
Note is primarily concerned with Title I of FSRIA, which regulates
commodity subsidy programs. 60 FSRIA subsidizes statutorily specified
commodities through three main avenues: direct subsidy payments, 6'
counter-cyclical payments,62 and marketing loans.63
Unlike the system of non-crop specific PFC payments created
by FAIR, FSRIA harks back to the days of the AAA and effectively
One Giant Leap Towards Corporate Production in Iowa, 29 IOWA J. CORP. L. 199, 207
(2003).
56. Id. Despite a spirited debate, however, FSRIA passed the House of Representatives
with a vote of 280-141 and the Senate with a vote of 64-35. See Keith Gray, Farm Security
and Rural Investment Act of 2002, Ala. Farmer's Fed'n (July 23, 2002), at
http://www.alfafarmers.com/issues/farmbill.phtml.
57. See Paul C. Westcott et al., The 2002 Farm Act: Provisions and Implications for
Commodity Markets, USDA EcON. RES. SERV., Agric. Information Bulletin Number 778,
Nov. 2002, at 4.
58. Congressional Budget Office Pay-As-You-Go Estimate, H.R. Farm Security and
Rural Investment Act of 2002, at http://www.cbo.gov./showdoc.cfm?index=
3468&sequence=0 at 5 (last visited Feb. 6, 2005).
59. Id.
60. 7 U.S.C. § 7901 (2004). Commodities that are directly subsidized include wheat,
corn, grain, sorghum, barley, oats, upland cotton, rice, soybeans, and other oilseeds. 7
U.S.C. § 7901(4). Commodities that may receive market loan assistance include wheat,
corn, grain, sorghum, barley, oats, upland cotton, extra long staple cotton, rice, soybeans,
other oilseeds, wool, mohair, honey, dry peas, lentils, and small chickpeas. 7 U.S.C. §
7901(8).
61. See infra notes 66-70 and accompanying text.
62. See infra notes 71-76 and accompanying text.
63. See infra notes 77-80 and accompanying text.
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reties direct subsidy payments to specific crops.64 Eliminating the
freedom to farm, these direct payments are fixed on a per unit rate for
the entire life of FSRIA, instead of under the FAIR model of fixing the
payments at the end of each fiscal year upon assessing current market
conditions.65
A farmer will receive a direct subsidy payment if the market
price of a FSRIA-specified commodity is below the target price
established in FSRIA.66 The direct payment itself is the market price of
the crop plus the direct payment rate statutorily set in FSRIA.67 The
amount of this payment will depend largely on how much land a farmer
owns and the ultimate size of his crop yield.68 Unlike the system
devised in FAIR that did not require farmers to grow a specific crop in
order to receive a subsidy payment, farmers may receive a direct
subsidy payment under FSRIA only if they grow one of the specific
subsidized crops. 69 Thus, unlike FAIR programs that kept managerial
control and flexibility in the hands of the farmer, direct payments cede
decision-making control back to the government.7 °
In another departure from FAIR, FSRIA also makes counter-
cyclical payments (CCPs) available to supplement the direct
payments.7' If the average market price of the subsidized commodity
plus the direct payment rate to the farmer falls below the FSRIA-
mandated target price for the commodity, then the government makes a
CCP at a rate that covers the difference. 72 For example, the target price
for corn in 2002 is $2.60 a bushel and the direct payment rate is $0.28 a
bushel.73 If the season market price of corn is $2.20 per bushel, the
direct payment made will be $2.48. 74 Since this is below the statutory
target price of $2.60, the farmer will receive a CCP of $0.12.71 Similar






70. See Wescott et al., supra note 57, at 4; see also supra notes 34-47 and
accompanying text.
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to the direct payment system, base acreage is a large variable in the
CCP calculation and the total CCP a farmer receives will in large part
depend on how much land he farms.76
Finally, FSRIA established a system of federally-backed
commodity loans in addition to direct payments and CCPs as a way to
provide loans "to farmers of [commodities specified in FSRIA] when
market prices are low., 77 The Secretary of Agriculture is not permitted
to monitor loan rates based on market conditions, unlike the loan
requirements that existed under FAIR. 78  A farmer may receive loan
assistance if he grows a FSRIA-specified crop and pledges his yield as
collateral for the loan. 79  These loans are nonrecourse and will be
deemed paid in full if the farmer simply forfeits his crop in its entirety
to the government, regardless of the crop's actual market value. 80
Passage of FSRIA led some critics to wonder if it represented
the final abandonment of the reform-era policies of FAIR.81 While
some provisions of FAIR carried over to FSRIA, albeit in altered
form,82 FSRIA constitutes a substantive reversal of the reforms initiated
in 1996.83 Instead of "furthering the [FAIR] trend toward market
orientation in the agricultural sector, ' 84 FSRIA programs deny the
farmer flexibility in planting choices, 85 fix various payment rates
statutorily rather than in accordance with market activity,86 and fix
acreage requirements around historical levels rather than modem
conditions,87 all of which weaken the ability of the small farmer to
compete effectively.88
76. Id.
77. See Wescott et al., supra note 57, at 6.
78. Id. at 5.
79. Id. at 6.
80. Id.
81. See Riedl, supra note 8, at 1.
82. Id. at 2. Although beyond the scope of this Note, FSRIA continues the land-idling
conservation programs of FAIR. Id. The marketing assistance loan program is also found
in FAIR, but FSRIA alters the way in which loan rates are determined. See generally
Wescott et al. supra note 57, at 5.
83. See supra notes 29-80 and accompanying text.
84. Westcott et al., supra note 57, at 2.
85. See generally Riedl, supra note 8, at 2.
86. See Westcott et al., supra note 57, at 4.
87. See id. at 5.
88. See infra notes 94-126 and accompanying text.
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III. FEDERAL SUBSIDIES AND FINANCING THE SMALL FARM
A. The Mechanics of FSRIA Subsidies: How Subsidies are Distributed
As the discussion above indicates, "eligibility for farm subsidies
is determined not by income or poverty standards, but by the crop that is
grown." 89 Although FSRIA provides $242.5 billion in subsidies, only
thirty three percent of the 2.1 million farmers counted in the 2002
Census of Agriculture received any government aid at all.90 Even if a
farm does fall into the percentage of U.S. farms actually growing a
subsidized crop eligible for subsidy payments under FSRIA, only one
percent of all recipients of commodity subsidies receives twenty three
percent of all available monies.9' Further aggregation shows that the
top twenty percent of subsidy recipients receive eighty seven percent of
all the available monies.92 In the unlikely event that small farmers are
actually growing federally subsidized crops, they are unlikely to benefit
under FSRIA, since small farmers are statistically likely to fall within
the bottom eighty percent of farms benefiting from subsidy money,
receiving only thirteen percent of all subsidy monies.93
B. Unprofitable Cycle-How FSRIA Subsidies Increase the Risk of
Lending to Small Farmers
FSRIA subsidies increase the risk of lending to small farmers
through a cyclical process.9 4 In general, financial institutions lend when
the person to whom they are lending can pay back the sums borrowed,
plus interest.95 In the agricultural realm, financial institutions look upon
federal farm subsidies as a consistent and guaranteed source of cash
flow.96 When a farmer has access to this stable and reliable source of
89. Riedl, supra note 7, at 1.
90. The Environmental Working Group, What's the Plan? U.S. Farm Subsidies, 1995
through 2003, at http://www.ewg.org: 16080/farm/findings.php (last visited Feb. 6, 2005).
91. The Environmental Working Group, supra note 4. 17,073 farms comprise the top
one percent and they receive twenty three percent of the subsidies. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. See infra notes 94-126 and accompanying text.
95. See LISSA L. BROOME & JARRY W. MARKHAM, REGULATION OF BANK FINANCIAL
SERVICE ACTIVITIES 141 (West Group, 2001).
96. See Laurent Belsie, Farm Subsidies Prop up Midwest Land Values, THE CHRISTIAN
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cash flow, he becomes an attractive candidate to receive valuable
loans.97  As the discussion below will describe, FSRIA subsidies
interrupt this normal business relationship when it comes to the small
farmer and financial institutions.98 The end result of this cycle increases
the risk of lending to small farmers, as the mechanisms of FSRIA
subsidies themselves perpetually deprive the small farmer of the federal
guarantee that makes agricultural lending less risky.99
1. The Subsidy Cycle, Capital Intensity, and Land Values
Both direct payments and CCPs made under FSRIA are
calculated based on the amount of the subsidized crop grown and the
acreage on which the crops are grown. l° Therefore, the more a farmer
can produce of a subsidized crop, the higher the subsidy payments he
will receive, implicating considerations of capital investment and land
ownership. As discussed above in section II.D, FSRIA subsidy
payments are tied to specific crops, such as corn, wheat, and other
grains, which tend to be crops requiring significant capital investments
in the form of large machinery and other equipment.'0 ' This level of
capital might not be readily available to the small farmer, thus limiting
his ability to grow these crops and take advantage of any federal
subsidy monies from the beginning.1
0 2
Further, since a farm can produce more crops on more land, the
SCI. MONITOR, Jan. 4, 2002, at 2.
97. Id. at 3.
98. See infra notes 100-126 and accompanying text.
99. See infra notes 100-126 and accompanying text.
100. See Westcott et al., supra note 56, at 5.
101. See, e.g., USDA ECON. RES. SERVICE, Wheat Production Costs and Returns Per
Planted Acre, at http://www.ers.usda.gov/data/costsandreturns/data/current/C-Whea.xls (last
visited Feb. 6, 2005). For example, the total operating costs in the United States per planted
acre of wheat, excluding government payments, was $67.79, up almost $10 from 2002. Id.
When the costs of equipment and labor are factored in, total costs soar to $191.41 per acre,
up almost $20 from 2002. Id. In making these calculations, the USDA assumes that the
enterprise size will be at least 296 planted acres, recovering 40.8 bushels of wheat per acre
at $3.07 per bushel. Id. To put costs in perspective, before receiving federal assistance,
each acre of this large enterprise will only make $125.26 per acre of wheat, while the total
cost per acre is $191.41. Id.
102. Id. In the above wheat example, the mere cost of running the 296 acre wheat farm
is $56,655 per year, but only 36.1% of farms in the United States make an annual income of
more than $50,000. See USDA ECON. RES. SERV. at http://www.usda.gov/nass/pubs/
agr03/03-ch9.pdf (last visited Feb. 6, 2005).
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result of the FSRIA subsidy formula is that large-acreage farms will
receive more subsidy payments. 103 To be profitable, FSRIA-subsidized
crops such as corn, wheat, and other grains must be commercially
grown in large quantities, which in turn requires large amounts of
land.' 4 By tying the amount of payments to historical yields and
amount of base acreage, FSRIA subsidies favor those farms with vast
acreage, as well as those farms that can afford the machinery and
equipment necessary to harvest those types of crops. 0 5 Thus, not only
may it be difficult for a small farmer to be in the business of growing
these traditional crops, even if they could, they are unlikely to own
enough land to obtain a significant subsidy payment under the FSRIA
formula. 1
06
Land ownership is also important to consider, as farm
landowners also benefit indirectly from subsidies "because farm
subsidies largely get capitalized in higher farm land values."'0 7 If the
landowners grow subsidized crops, federal farm subsidies provide a
practically guaranteed stream of income to recipient landowners,
thereby propping up the overall value of the real estate. 0 8 Further, an
increase in land value affords greater access to credit, and large farmers
may use their land as collateral to obtain additional funds, which they
may in turn use to increase production or purchase new equipment,
technology, or land.'0 9 Therefore, while large farmers that own the most
land benefit from subsidies in the form of direct payments and CCPs,
they also benefit indirectly as a result of increased land values." 0 By
borrowing against their land, large farmers obtain financial resources
that allow them to further advance their already formidable economies
of scale.
103. See Wescott et al., supra note 57, at 5.
104. See supra note 101. The wheat example used in note 101 assumes that a farm will
dedicate at least 296 acres to growing wheat. In 2002, 75.8% of United States farms, all
making less than $250,000 per year, had acreage ranging from 73 acres to 496 acres. Id.
Farms making more than $250,000, or 7.3%, have acreage ranging from 1,708 acres to
3,455 acres. USDA ECON. REs. SERV. at http://www.usda.gov/nass/pubs/agr03/03_ch9.pdf
(last visited Feb. 6, 2005).
105. See supra notes 66-88 and accompanying text.
106. See Belsie, supra note 96.
107. Edwards & DeHaven, supra note 33, at 7.
108. Belsie, supra note 96, at 1.
109. Id.
110. See supra notes 100-109 and accompanying text.
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2. The Impact of Higher Land Values on the Small Farmer
FSRIA extends subsidy benefits through 2012, and federal farm
subsidies have existed in some form for the past seven decades."'
Federal farm subsidies are, therefore, considered to be stable and
predictable sources of cash flow. 1 2 One study concluded that just $1 of
direct subsidy payments to a farmer "tends to add $5.40 per acre to the
value of farm land."' 3  This same study, using a slightly different
model, found that an additional $1 of CCPs to a farmer could increase
land values by $7.02 per acre.' 14 This significant increase in the value
of farmland creates a vicious cycle, with high farmland prices making it
difficult for young people and non-landowners to purchase farms." 5
Even if small farmers do own their land, this increase in value is
unlikely to be significant enough to offset the fact that a small farm
often does not produce a high enough yield to realize direct subsidy
benefits." 6 Further, if small farmers do own their own land, it is not
likely to be large enough in terms of base acreage to justify the capital
costs necessary to farm the FSRIA-subsidized crops." 1
7
In order to stay in the business of farming, some farmers rent the
land that they farm. In 1999, about forty five percent of U.S. farmland
was operated by a farmer other than the landowner." 8  Under share
lease arrangements, a common form of lease agreement between
landowners and farm operators, the landlord "shares in the risk of
market returns and thus receives a share of the subsidy directly from the
government."'' 9 The landlord, by virtue of his superior bargaining
power, typically sets the lease rates in a manner that extracts a large
proportion of subsidy payments from tenants. 20  An additional $1 of
111. See supra notes 24-54 and accompanying text.
112. See supra notes 95-109 and accompanying text.
113. See generally Barry K. Goodwin et al., Landowners' Riches: The Distribution of
Agricultural Subsidies (May 2003), at http://economics.uchicago.edu/download/lr-Chicago.
pdf#search='Iandowners%20riches:%20the%20distribution%20of%2Oagricultura%20subsi
dies', at 13.
114. Id. at 14.
115. Edwards & DeHaven, supra note 33, at 7.
116. See supra notes 100-109 and accompanying text.
117. See supra notes 100-109 and accompanying text.
118. Goodwin et al., supra note 113, at 1.




CCPs, for example, may raise the rental rate by about $0.53 per acre,
allowing the landowner to absorb any subsidy benefit intended to go to
the farm operator under the guise of higher rents. 121
FSRIA subsidies thus reward farms that grow capital intensive
crops on large amounts of owned land. 22 Consequently, the subsidies
may act to preclude non-landowning small farmers from becoming
landowners. This occurs because the guarantee of federal money to
farms that grow subsidized crops raises land prices, thereby pricing the
small farmer out of the real estate market. 123 If small farmers do not
already own their own land, they may resort to renting, oftentimes at a
high cost and under unfavorable lease agreements.1
24
In short, not only do small farmers seldom receive direct
subsidy money, they are also generally precluded from buying land that
could bolster their cash flow. 125 This unprofitable cycle increases the
risk of lending to small farmers because the mechanisms of FSRIA
subsidy programs decrease the small farmer's earning potential. 126 As
the risk of lending increases, lending institutions should engage in
careful risk management when deciding to extend credit to small
farmers. 1
27
C. Managing Risk in Agricultural Lending-Cautionary Lending
Small farmers are unlikely to receive higher cash flow either
through direct subsidy benefits or by way of the consequential land
appreciation. 128  As large farms continue to grow, it is unlikely that
small farms will be able to compete effectively, as weak cash flows may
lead to a decrease in overall investment in the small farm and increased
accumulation of debt over time to fund the enterprise. 129 In other words,
if a small farmer has a weak cash flow, "[his] financing demands...
121. Id.
122. See supra notes 111-117 and accompanying text.
123. See generally Goodwin et al., supra note 113.
124. Id. at 2.
125. See Westcott et al., supra note 57, at 6.
126. See supra notes 100-126 and accompanying text.
127. See infra notes 128-206 and accompanying text.
128. See supra notes 100-126 and accompanying text.
129. RICHARD E. JUST & RULON D. POPE, Finance and Risk Bearing in Agriculture, A
COMPREHENSIVE ASSESSMENT OF THE ROLE OF RISK IN U.S. AGRICULTURE, 375 (Ariel Dinar,
ed., Kluwer Academic Publishers 2002).
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could increase substantially at the same time that [his] creditworthiness
is declining."
' 130
In short, as their cash flows fall relative to those of large farms
as a result of the subsidy structure enacted in FSRIA, small farmers may
look to borrow additional funds from lending institutions in order to
expand or improve their operations.13 1  The risk is that small farmers
may be ultimately unable to service their debt due to lack of stable and
reliable income streams. 132  Further, small farmers may not have
valuable land assets that could be held as security by lenders.133 FSRIA,
by effectively excluding small farm operations from federal subsidies,
increases the amount of risk lending institutions face when considering
whether to extend credit to small farm clients. 1
3 4
1. Possible Inter-Institutional Risk Management Strategies
However, these issues do not necessarily suggest that lending
institutions should automatically refuse to lend to small farmers, as
lenders have developed mechanisms that help in the assessment of
lending risk to agricultural clients. 135  By increasing the size and
diversity of their cumulative loan portfolios, for example, lending
institutions can diffuse the "stand-alone credit risk" of individual
agricultural loans. 36  Although diversification could be difficult for
agricultural banks because they primarily hold agricultural loans, 137 risk-
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 376.
133. See supra notes 100-126 and accompanying text. While marketing loan assistance
may fill this gap at least in part, the small farmer would have to be eligible for the program
by growing one of the specifically covered commodities, in a volume significant enough to
yield a large enough loan. See supra notes 77-78.
134. See supra notes 89-126 and accompanying text. As of 2002, commercial banks, the
Farm Credit System, the Farm Service Agency, and life insurance companies accounted for
79.3% of outstanding farm loans Commercial banks provide the majority of credit to the
agricultural sector. See Jerome Stain, et al., Agricultural Income and Finance Annual
Lender Issue, USDA ECON. RES. SERVICE, Mar. 11, 2003, at 7. Commercial banks hold
17.6% of all agricultural real estate debt, and 21.8% of non-real estate agricultural debt. Id.
Agricultural banks, or those commercial banks whose "ratio of farm loans to total loans
exceeds the unweighted average of the ratio at all banks on a given date," hold a slim
majority of farm loans Id.
135. JUST & POPE, supra note 129, at 375.
136. See id.
137. See Stain et al., supra note 134.
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adjusted pricing schemes that group borrowers into several credit risk
classes for monitoring and pricing may help diffuse risk of default. "'
Lending institutions may also collect and process more
information about the creditworthiness of agricultural borrowers prior to
lending. 139  Lending institutions increasingly utilize highly complex
agricultural credit risk models that work to predict the probability of
loss. 140 New advances in econometrics and increased lender access to
technology make it increasingly easier for lenders to manage risk within
these model-generated risk management categories.
141 These complex
models are able to take into consideration a variety of factors, such as
interest rate fluctuations and other unique operational risks associated
with agricultural production. 142  Since most lenders are already
experienced at generating risk ratings and credit scores, these
econometric modeling concepts may prove highly useful for managing
agricultural lending risk. 
143
Agricultural lenders may also make use of a tactic known as a
"farm visit" to maintain contact with and to monitor small farm
clients. 144 The farm visit occurs when a lender actually travels to the
farm being financed in order to assess performance and examine record
keeping; this tactic falls into a category of risk management known as
performance management. 145 A lender may use farm visits to monitor
potential risk by maintaining a close relationship with the small farmer
138. JUST & POPE, supra note 129, at 375.
139. Id. at 377.
140. Id.
141. See generally Nick Walraven & Peter Barry, Bank Risk Ratings and the Pricing of
Agricultural Loans (Sept. 2003), at http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/2003/
200353/200353pap.pdf. Loans are typically placed in one of five categories. Id. at 5.
Loans in Category 1 bear virtually no risk of loss to the bank. Loans in Category 2 are
"very unlikely" to result in a loss to the bank. Id. Category 3 loans bear "moderate risk" of
loss to the lender. Id. Loans placed in Category 4 bear an "acceptable degree of risk," but
were in some way slightly substandard. Id. Finally, Category 5 loans bear the highest
degree of risk, and were described as "special mention loans." Id.
142. JUST & POPE, supra note 129, at 377.
143. Id. at 378. Concepts of risk modeling are evolving as banks' credit risks continue to
evolve. See Walraven & Barry, supra note 141, at 24. "The future will likely bring wider
use of dual rating systems (frequency of default by borrower and severity of default
associated with loan transactions), as well as closer linkages between loan pricing, credit
risk, economic capital, and risk-adjusted returns on capital." Id.
144. JUST & POPE, supra note 129, at 379.
145. Id.
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and engaging in more frequent and personalized contact. 46 Lenders
may thus minimize risk by familiarizing themselves with the
characteristics and financial habits of their small farm client.147  In
extreme cases, lenders may maintain personnel on the farm site, giving
the lender on-line access to the farmer's accounting system. 48  By
maintaining increased contact, if the small farmer experiences trouble,
the lender is likely to know sooner and be able to take prompt action to
address any problems before the situation deteriorates. 49
Lenders may also reduce risk by holding a credit reserve for
small farm clients as a means of providing emergency liquidity. 5 °
Farmers refer to lenders that offer this practice as "friendly bankers."''
Lenders may take this credit reserve and extend it as a line of credit to a
farmer, and this reserve may also be used flexibly to provide carry-over
loans or refinancing in times of adversity. 52 With this risk management
technique, the lending institution can "fall back on the credit reserve in
times of adversity when financial obligations are difficult to meet. '153
Lending institutions may also control risk through debt contract
provisions that revert significant control to the lender under times of
extreme adversity. 154 As the "stake in the borrower's unit increases and
as more of the costs of the borrower's actions are incurred by lenders
through increased credit risks,"'' 55 contract provisions can shift control
rights to the lender. 56 The lender may achieve this control through
contract provisions that determine everything from the repayment
schedule of the loan, to requiring mandatory site inspections, to setting
the accounting formats the farmer must use and mandating what types
of insurance the farmer must hold.'57 By constraining the actions the





150. JUST & POPE, supra note 129, at 379.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 381.
153. Id. at 379.
154. Id. at 381.
155. Id.




risk and improves the loan performance forecast. 158
Finally, lenders may exert significant influence on the way a
small farmer manages his own risk by simply encouraging other risk
management practices. 159  For example, a lender may encourage its
small farm client to "employ forward contracts for crop sales, [to hedge]
in futures markets, [to obtain] crop insurance, [or to engage in] other
risk management practices. 1 60 These practices do not necessarily have
to be formally agreed to in a written contract, but may be subtly
encouraged by increasing communication with small farm clients and
by acting as a flexible lender.1 6' By encouraging prudent farm
management, lending institutions can further protect their investment.
2. Possible Governmental Risk Management Assistance
While the above strategies primarily focus on strengthening the
relationship between the farmer and the individual lender, the federal
government may also offer risk management assistance to the 
lender.162
The Federal Agricultural Mortgage Corporation, or Farmer Mac, was
created by the Agricultural Credit Act of 1987, which added a new Title
VIII to the Farm Credit Act of 1971.163 Farmer Mac is a government-
sponsored entity that is fully stockholder owned.' 64  Farmer Mac
operates a secondary market for first lien agricultural real estate loans,
"created to improve the availability of long-term credit at stable interest
rates" to farmers by shifting the risk of agricultural lending through
securitization from banks to investors. 65 Like the familiar Fannie Mae
and Freddie Mac, Farmer Mac funds its loan purchases by "issuing debt
or securities backed by pools of loans and selling them into the capital
markets."' 166 Farmer Mac is able to guarantee these mortgage-backed




162. See infra notes 163-197 and accompanying text.
163. 12 U.S.C. §§ 2279aa et seq. (2000).
164. Farmer Mac FAQ's, at http://www.farmermac.com/Borrowers/About/about-
famc-faqmain.asp (last visited Nov. 21, 2004).
165. Farmer Mac Information, at http://www.farmermac.com/ (last visited Nov. 21,
2004).
166. Farmer Mac Programs, at http://www.farmermac.com/Lenders/Program
Desc/fmac-main.asp (last visited Nov. 21, 2004).
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securities with a $1.5 billion line of credit at the United States
Treasury.1
67
Farmer Mac operates two main programs, known as the Farmer
Mac I program and the Farmer Mac II program.168 In the Farmer Mac I
program, Farmer Mac purchases qualified loans from lenders who are
approved sellers. 169 In order to become a qualified seller, the lender
must meet specified criteria."0 These criteria include a "demonstrated
ability to and service of mortgage loans which qualify for Farmer Mac's
full or part-time farm program, maintenance of a minimum net worth of
$1 million according to GAAP accounting rules, maintenance of
Fidelity Bond and Errors and Omissions coverage, and ownership of
Farmer Mac Class A or Class B Common Stock."' 17 1 Once a lender
applies for and meets these criteria, Farmer Mac will purchase first lien
real estate loans directly from the lender. 1
72
The Farmer Mac II program is open to any lender or other seller
of USDA guaranteed loans and no additional approval of the seller or
stock purchase is required. 73 Lenders are simply required to "originate
USDA guaranteed loans in accordance with existing USDA standards
and procedures.' 74  These lenders may then "sell the guaranteed
portions of USDA loans directly to Farmer Mac."'' 75  The USDA
guarantees three main types of loans, from the Farm Service Agency
(FSA), the Rural Business Service (RBS), and the Rural Housing
Service (RHS).
176
It is important to briefly discuss the FSA, as modem
congressional limitations on FSA lending abilities may reduce the
widespread effectiveness of the Farmer Mac II program, since FSA
167. Farmer Mac FAQ's, supra note 164.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Farmer Mac I Sellers, at http://www.farmermac.com/Lenders/Program-Desc/FMI/
fmacI-main.asp (last visited Nov. 21, 2004).
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Farmer Mac II Programs, at http://www.farmermac.comLenders/ProgramDesc/
MII/fmacII_ main.asp (last visited Nov. 21, 2004).
174. Id.
175. Id.




loans are a type of USDA-guaranteed loans.177 The FSA was created
within the USDA in 1946 for the express purpose of "providing credit
to eligible farmers who [could not] obtain credit elsewhere."
1 78 The
farm financial crisis of the 1980s, 7 9 however, took a deleterious toll on
the FSA's loan portfolio. 8° During this time period, the economic
fragility of FSA borrowers, combined with questionable lending
practices led to widespread defaults and large losses. 18' As a result,
Congress reduced the already limited lending authority granted to the
FSA, and by 1999, FSA directing lending was at its lowest rate since
1946, when the agency was first created.
82
Through participation in its programs, however, Farmer Mac
can help lenders minimize risk by employing securitization technologies
that shift the credit risk to Farmer Mac while leaving the loans with the
originating institution to perform managerial functions.
183  While
securitization by Farmer Mac is a valuable risk management tool, the
limitations of this approach should be noted. 8 4 In order to qualify for
Farmer Mac I, a lender must meet certain criteria, including having a
minimum net worth of $1 million and purchasing a set amount of
Farmer Mac stock, which may be unrealistic for some 
lenders. 85
Further, if a lender qualifies as a seller, Farmer Mac will only purchase
first lien mortgage loans secured by real estate. 186 While there are likely
many of these first lien loans, this risk protection will not extend to any
second loans made for refinancing purposes or loans intended for the
purchase of new technology or for improvements that may be secured
by something other than real estate.
187
While Farmer Mac II requires no further accreditation beyond
simply holding USDA-backed loans, 188 other problems arise. As noted
in the discussion above, FSA loans are a type of USDA-backed loans
177. Id.
178. See Schneider, supra note 12, at 230.
179. See supra note 50.
180. See Schneider, supra note 12, at 230.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Farmer Mac Programs, supra note 166.
184. See infra notes 185-190 and accompanying text.
185. See Farmer Mac I Sellers, supra note 170.
186. Farmer Mac FAQs, supra note 164.
187. See id.
188. Farmer Mac II Programs, supra note 173.
2632005]
NORTH CAROLINA BANKING INSTITUTE
that Farmer Mac will accept. 189 After the crisis in the 1980s when FSA
lending power was reduced, compounded with the FSA's special status
as a "lender of last resort," a lender may not be likely to hold many of
these loans.' 90
The FDIC also discusses a number of the risk management
techniques discussed above, and adds the additional consideration of
amortization schedule management.19' An amortization schedule
reflects the time period over which the principle and interest due on a
loan are paid back, that may help lenders minimize risk.' 92 An
amortization period that is too long may leave the lender under-secured
towards the end of the loan, "when the borrower's financial
circumstances may have changed."'' 93 On the other hand, a too-rapid
amortization can "impose an undue burden on the cash flow capacity of
the farming operation," which may lead to default. 194  Accordingly,
lenders should examine whether or not their amortization scheduling is
correlating with the "useful economic life of the underlying collateral
and with the operation's debt service capacity.' 95 The FDIC recognizes
that "orderly liquidation of agricultural debt" is critical in preventing
collection problems from occurring. 196 As such, lenders may want to
reexamine their amortization decisions on agricultural loans. 197
189. Id.
190. See Schneider, supra note 12, at 230. As FSA receives limited funding for direct
loans, applicants sometimes have to wait for funds to become available. See FSA
Information, at http://www.fsa.usda.gov/dafl/ default.htm (last visited Nov. 21, 2004). To
qualify for a direct loan, the applicant must be able to show sufficient repayment ability and
pledge enough collateral to fully secure the loan, which may also pose problems for young
farmers or farmers experiencing financial difficulties. Id.
191. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. Manual of Examination Policies at http://www.
fdic.gov/regulations/safety/manual/Section3-I.html#AgriculturalLoans (last visited Nov. 21,
2004).
192. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 93 (8th ed. 1999).




197. See supra notes 191-196 and accompanying text.
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3. The Federal Government's Recognition of the Risk in Agricultural
Lending
Lenders, especially those regulated by the FDIC, will be glad to
note that regulators seem to have recognized the risk in agricultural
lending and are working to issue helpful guidelines to bank
examiners.'"9 For example, while examiners should still be critical of
an institution's managerial activities, they should also be more lenient in
recognizing "when the bank is taking reasonable steps to deal with these
external risk factors."' 99 Thus, it appears that the FDIC is willing to
adopt a flexible approach when lenders are taking unconventional but
constructive steps to deal with the difficulties of agricultural lending,
such as loan restructuring or providing extended terms of repayment.2°
In order to determine the health of the lender's loan portfolio, FDIC
examiners have indicated a willingness to recognize informal payment
agreements between the farmer and the lender, even if they are not
reflected on the promissory notes themselves.2 °' So long as lenders are
engaging in risk management in a prudent manner, the FDIC appears
willing to tolerate a heightened level of creative risk management.20 2
Each financial relationship between a lender and a small farm
client will be unique, and the strategies described above may apply in
different ways to various situations.0 3 While some of these strategies
may not fit every situation, and although some may not be applicable to
every bank and every farmer, these management strategies are potential
ways in which lending institutions can work to minimize the risk of
lending to small farm clients. 204 Although FSRIA subsidy policies may
increase the risk of lending to small farm clients by decreasing the
overall cash flows of small farms relative to large farms, 0 5 lending
198. Supra notes 191-196 and accompanying text.
199. Supra notes 191-196 and accompanying text.
200. Supra notes 191-196 and accompanying text.
201. Supra notes 191-196 and accompanying text.
202. See supra notes 192-201 and accompanying text.
203. See generally Agric. Lending, First Nat'l Bank of Shelby, at
http://www.ots.treas.gov/docs/4/48050.pdf (last visited Nov. 23, 2004). This is an
interesting Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS) article that details how a Nebraska bank
successfully employed various risk management techniques outlined in this Note to improve
its agricultural lending practices. Id.
204. See supra notes 128-202 and accompanying text.
205. See supra notes 94-126 and accompanying text.
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institutions can and should take steps to implement effective risk
management with respect to lending to small farmers.0 6
IV. CONCLUSION-SELLING OUT THE FARM? THE IMPACT OF THE FARM
SECURITY AND RURAL INVESTMENT ACT OF 2002 ON LENDING
INSTITUTIONS AND THE SMALL FARMER
The institution of the small farm has enjoyed historical
prominence and support throughout American history. As the
"foremost proponent of the agrarian ideal," Thomas Jefferson
envisioned a nation of small and independent farmers that would
provide the foundation for the American republic. 27 Although the
percentage of the American workforce engaged in agriculture has
declined over time since the industrial age, ninety two percent of those
engaged in agriculture are small farmers. 08 Further, Americans still
cling to the vision of the small family farm as one of the last bastions of
old-fashioned independence and self-reliance. 20 9 Considering farming
one of "mankind's noblest crafts," many see the decline of the small
farmer as the victory of industrial process over a way of life.210 While
time may not be on the side of the small farmer, strong American
support for the small farmer as a nostalgic reminder of its earlier days
compounded with the large percentage of American farmers still
qualifying as small farmers warrants at least a cursory exploration into
how the institution may be preserved.2 1
From the inception of subsidies during the Great Depression to
the recent signing of the Federal Security and Rural Investment Act in
2002 (FSRIA),212 politicians often justify farm subsidy legislation by the
206. See infra notes 207-218 and accompanying text.
207. See Lisi Krall, Thomas Jefferson's Agrarian Vision and the Changing Nature of
Property, 36 J. EcON. ISSUES 131 (2002).
208. See USDA NATL. AGRIC. STATISTICS SERV., supra note 13.
209. See, e.g., Small Farmer's Journal: Who and What We Are, at
http://www.smallfarmersjoumal.com/docs/pg/about.html (last visited Jan. 7, 2005).
210. Id.
211. See id.; see also USDA NATL. AGRIC. STATISTICS SERV., supra note 13. But see
Steve Cocheo, Disappearing Harvest?, ABA BANKING J., Nov. 2002, at 41. In this piece,
Dr. Steven Blank of the University of California at Davis argues that the production of food
and other agricultural products will altogether "disappear from the United States because it
will be unprofitable to tie up resources in farming and ranching." Id.
212. 7 U.S.C. § 7901 (2004).
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need to improve the impoverished condition of the small farmer.1 3
Rarely, however, have subsidy programs gone to benefit the small rural
farmer reminiscent of the old Jeffersonian ideal.21 4 In reality, federal
subsidy programs increasingly pad the pockets of large corporate farms,
and contribute to income instability for the small farmers that subsidy
legislation is said to benefit.
215
While subsidy legislation may increasingly sound the death
knell to small farm viability in the United States, FSRIA also negatively
impacts the banking industry, as subsidy programs increase the risk
lending institutions incur if they chose to lend to small farming
operations. If lending institutions want to maintain this client base,
especially in areas where agricultural lending has been a traditional part
of the community banking function, lenders will have to take on
additional means of risk management in order to avoid losses.216
While policies enacted in 1996 under the Farm and Agricultural
Improvement and Reform Act (FAIR) were not perfect, they signaled a
move towards market-based reform of agricultural policies and the so-
called "freedom to farm. 217  Unfortunately, FSRIA largely squelched
any movement away from traditional federal subsidies reminiscent of
the Depression Era.21 8 While it will be interesting to see if current
conditions compel Congress to modernize subsidy legislation or make it
more relevant to the small farmers used in political rhetoric to justify
the legislation, it does not seem likely that the inefficient and unrealistic
price supports set out in FSRIA will end any time soon. Until FSRIA
expires or unless Congress intervenes, lenders will have to engage in
213. See generally Goodwin, et al., supra note 113, at 19. Put another way, "the idea
that subsidies preserve the small family farm is a political myth, but a useful one for tugging
the heartstrings of voters who contribute their tax money to this cause." George Melloan,
Farm Subsidies, Like Death and Taxes, Just Won't Go Away, WALL ST. J., May 29, 2001, at
A23. Perhaps impliedly recognizing the plight of the small farmer, President John
Fitzgerald Kennedy said that "the farmer is the only man in our economy who buys
everything at retail, sells everything at wholesale, and pays the freight both ways."
Quotation at http://www.nonstopenglish.com/reading/quotations/index.asp?search=freight
(last visited Feb. 6, 2005).
214. See Goodwin, et al., supra note 113, at 19. For an interesting discussion of Thomas
Jefferson's impact on American agriculture, see generally Krall, supra note 207.
215. See The Environmental Working Group, supra note 5.
216. See supra notes 128-206 and accompanying text.
217. See generally Riedl, supra note 8, at 1.
218. See, e.g., Bush, supra note 1 (discussing FSRIA and outlining the federal
government's continued support of federal farm subsidy legislation).
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careful risk monitoring efforts in order to manage the risks that come
with extending credit to a small farm borrower, or lose small farm
clients altogether, which would be detrimental to both the farming and
banking industries.
AMANDA STOKES
